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I
Supreme Decision: Roger Taney and the Dred Scott Case
By Mike Nicholas ‘07

Of all the events that pushed a divided nation closer and closer to war, none
seemed to have the power to ignite the passions of sectionalists more than the Dred Scott
Decision. What began as an obscure, relatively innocuous civil action in a Missouri
district court evolved into a national battle cry for abolitionists in the North, a vindication
of the peculiar institution for the South, and a catalyst that would ultimately bring the two
sides to settle their dispute on the battlefield. At the center of this controversial decision
was its principal architect and author, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney. Criticism of this
Marylander came from those who at one time held him in the highest esteem and
regarded him for his legal prowess, but who now despised him for what they considered
to be his abdication of legal principle in favor of a personal bias for slavery, a corrupt
bargain with the incoming president, and the final straw in a Southern conspiracy to
expand slavery. In truth, however, Taney’s opinion in Dred Scot vs. Sanford reflected
none of these sentiments, and was instead founded upon what he believed to be a sound
theory of constitutional jurisprudence.
Roger Brooke Taney was appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States
during the height of Andrew Jackson’s presidency. During this time, property
qualifications for suffrage were greatly reduced, and as a result the privilege was
extended to a far greater number of the citizenry than ever before. Consequently, the
affairs of the national government were now influenced by laborers and frontiersmen
alike, and when combined with the economic shift of the era (particularly in the north)
producing an unprecedented growth in industry, state governments found themselves
having to regulate beyond simple natural rights and into the realm of social and economic
legislation.1
This stood in contrast to the time of Taney’s predecessor, the famed Chief Justice
John Marshall, who along with his equally famous Marshall Court, had strictly limited
the reach of states into the social realm and preserved the power of the federal
Smith, Charles W. R obger B. Taney: Jacksonian Jurist. P.27
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government. The age of Jackson would prove a marked shift in constitutional doctrine,
and with Taney at the apex, the Court would swing towards allowing a strong state power
to regulate a whole range of interests, checked only when individual rights were
threatened against the will of the populace.2
This new doctrine manifested itself in a series of rulings giving the states broader
authority of regulation, something the Marshall Court had been hesitant to do. Among
them were Brown vs. Maryland, Briscoe vs Bank o f the Commonwealth o f Kentucky, and
Charles River Bridge vs Warren River Bridge. The common threads among them were
questions of state authority to regulate different aspects of police action and commerce by
the states over objections of federal jurisdiction. In Brown, the Court ruled that a
Maryland statute requiring the licensing of importers of various goods was constitutional
because it represented a police action by the state (as opposed to a regulation of
commerce, reserved for the federal government) and was therefore legitimate. Briscoe
saw the Court declare constitutional that individual states could charter banks, so long as
they did not issue separate bills of credit, and Charles River Bridge strictly construed the
obligation of contracts clause o f the federal constitution. In each of these cases, Taney
either authored the majority opinion or concurred in the outcome, and each case
represented an empowerment of the state governments, reversing a powerful federalist
trend.3
Along with the doctrinal shift of the Court came a change in the personality of its
Chief. Taney, unlike Marshall, was meticulous in avoiding direct involvement in politics,
and even avoided the mere appearance of impropriety or participation in any part of
deliberative political discourse. While Marshall had often debated questions of the Court
and endorsed political candidates in newspapers, Taney did not. This is not to say that he
had no such opinions or to suggest that he refrained from expressing them; rather the
form of such expression was usually confined to private correspondence or public
comment, but only in the realm of his official duties.4
Taney was, however, a strong believer in slavery, and a partisan one at that. His
opinions in Prigg vs. Pennsylvania and Groves vs. Slaughter reflect a deep defense of the
institution. Each case dealt with an aspect of slavery, the most notable being his dissent
in Prigg. The Court ruled that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the forcible removal of
a slave from its borders to be unconstitutional. While Taney agreed with the outcome, he
believed (and thus dissented) that the states could aid the federal government in the
exercise of its powers (in this case, the deliverance of fugitive slaves). His views on
slavery were never in doubt, but neither was his commitment to jurisprudence, evidenced
by his personal correspondence with members of both political parties and ideological
viewpoints.5
These events and incidents in the life and era o f Taney up to this point bear no
direct or causal link to the outcome of the Dred Scott case, but they do place the
proceedings in their proper context, and offer a window into the mind of the eventual
author of arguably one of the most famous decisions of the 19th Century. It is within this
backdrop that the Dred Scott case was brought before the Court for final argument on
2 Smith, Charles W. Robger B. Taney: Jacksonian Jurist. P. 28
3 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LL.D. Pp. 273-75.
4 Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics. P. 232.
! Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LL.D. Pn 282-284
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December 15th, 1856. The narrow issue was the plight of a one Dred Scott, a figure of
little significance prior to the decision involving his plea in abatement to have himself
declared free, by virtue of the fact that he had resided in free territory for a number of
years, after having previously served time as a slave. The lower courts of the state of
Missouri agreed with him, but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, and the case was
filed on his behalf in the federal court system, ultimately winding its way up to the
Supreme Court (the December 15th hearing was actually a re-argument before the Court).
On a broader and more relevant plane, the case presented three distinct questions
for the Court to decide. First, whether or not Dred Scott was a slave, and therefore
entitled to file suit in federal court. By extension, the Court was being asked to decide
whether or not all Negroes themselves were considered citizens of the United States.
Second, the Court was presented with arguments as to the status of Negroes held in free
states, whereby slavery is prohibited. The central question of this point was were they
free by virtue of residency in a free state, and by extension, was the “property” of the
slave owner forfeit upon entrance to a free state? Third, the Court was asked to consider
the constitutionality of federal legislation regulating slavery in the territories.
Specifically called into question here was the Missouri Compromise, ensuring no
territory above thirty degrees thirty minutes would permit slavery, and the KansasNebraska Act which formalized the doctrine of popular sovereignty—having the issue
decided by ballot referendum. The Court, through Taney, ultimately decided that Dred
Scott (and by extension, all slaves and former slaves) was not a citizen, that residency in
a free state did not deprive an owner of his property (including slaves), and that federal
legislation to the contrary was unconstitutional. While a superficial overview seems
simple enough, a deeper analysis into the actual deliberations of Taney and the Court,
along with the rationale behind the decision reveal a nearly unprecedented complex web
of legal intricacy.
That the first issue was to be decided by the Court was never in doubt, for the
question o f citizenship was a clear and obvious starting point for the case. Taney phrased
the question of Negro citizenship (Scott’s) in the form of asking “whether the
descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are bom of parents
who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the sense in which the
word is used in the Constitution of the United States.”6
In answering this question, Taney posited during deliberation that the Constitution
specifically formed various classes of people. The Constitution gave Congress specific
authority to naturalize Native Indians, and defined the body politic as “the people of the
United States,” which he then interpreted to be citizens. At no point in the history of the
nation had Negroes been considered citizens of equal stature to whites, and in fact were
considered “a subordinate and inferior class of being...and had no rights and privileges
but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to grant them.”7
It is important to note at this juncture that Taney considered the foregoing to be
the rule of law at the time of the framing of the Constitution, and he noted as such not
only in deliberations, but also in his writings, where he traced the institution from
Aristotle, who believed wholly in the order of nature (hence the “subordinate class of
being”), to the rise of Christianity, which in fact accepted it as a legal institution and only
6 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P. 62-63
7 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 63
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sought to regulate relations between master and slave, not dissolve the relationship
completely. Finally, Taney referenced the writings of his predecessor in 1825, when
John Marshall wrote that “....the world has agreed that it [slavery] is a legitimate use of
force.. .by general consent” and therefore authorized by the law of nations. Taney rested
on the belief that the Framers had considered their own view o f the legality and justness
of the issue of slavery and citizenship, and had decided the question in the form of the
Constitution, and therefore slaves, even former slaves, in keeping with long standing
legal tradition as well as the Constitution, were not to be considered citizens of the United
States.8
While this was sufficient for the federal question of jurisdiction, discrepancy
remained as to whether or not a slave or freed slave was a citizen of a particular state.
This question, according to Taney, still did not give Scott standing to sue, because even if
a state conferred citizenship upon him, it would not carry the force of law outside of the
state, and the state itself would be prohibited to “introduce a new member into the
political community created by the Constitution of the United States.” Therefore, Dred
Scott was not a citizen, and had no standing to sue for relief in federal court.9
While contemporary abolitionists argued that slavery was a reprehensible evil and
that freed slaves should be treated as citizens of the United States, at least in terms of the
right to file suit (although not necessarily equal to that of whites), Taney’s deliberations
were restricted to the study of history, precedent, and the standing law as to decide
question of citizenship. The government and the people of the United States had the
authority, in Taney’s view, to re-define the law through constitutional amendment, but
while this was proposed, it never came to fruition, and thus the supreme law of the land
was one in favor of denying citizenship to former slaves. Further justification lay in
Taney’s belief that “each age fixes the standard of right and wrong, of legality and
illegality for itself; and all rights.. .duties.. .and obligations descend to the next age,
binding it just as they bound the previous age” unless the standard itself is altered. The
Framers had spoken, the people had spoken (if through a lack of action to alter the status
quo rather than through a direct affirmation of the institution), and therefore precedent
bound the current generation.10
This is the juncture of the case that received the most criticism, the fact that Taney
proceeded to consider the remaining two points of the case (whether or not Negroes could
be free by virtue of residency in a free state and the constitutionality of federal laws to the
contrary). The question Taney was forced to answer was whether or not further
consideration of the case beyond the dispute of standing was to be considered obiter dicta
of the Court, or binding precedent upon questions of legal error. Taney concluded for the
latter, citing three distinct points. First, there was a subtle (yet important difference)
between the nature of a writ of error in state court and a writ of error in federal court.
The latter required that the entire body of evidence be presented to the appellate body.
Therefore, the Supreme Court had the complete record of the case, and was duty bound to
correct any errors it saw in the application o f federal law (and the Constitution) made by
lower courts. Second, the resolution of one error did not automatically prohibit further
consideration of any remaining errors to be found in the record. To the contrary, Taney
8 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LL.D. P p 370-71
9 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 63-64
10 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LL.D, Pp 344-4 5 ; 372-373
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argued that a failure to do so would de facto permit the same misconstruction/application
of federal law in the future. Finally, Taney found the need to resolve further error in the
Dred Scott case, specifically to address points raised during argument by both counsel
that were in error of federal law.11
With that as the logical framework for continuing, consideration o f the remaining
two points of the case was not in fact obiter dicta, but rather a ruling on the merits of the
case as a whole presented before the Court. To address these issues Taney framed the
following questions: “Were the Scotts free by reason of their stay in the territory? If they
were not, was Dred Scott himself free by reason of his sojourn to Illinois?” The answer
to the first question posed by Taney would also answer the third part of the overall case
(whether or not federal regulation prohibiting slaves from entering and remaining in
slavery between certain states was constitutional), while the answer to the second
question just posed by Taney would satisfy the second part of the overall case (whether
or not Dred Scott was free by virtue of his stay in a free state). The two answers would
have to be inexorably linked, or else be in a self-defeating form of contradiction.12
As to the question of Dred Scott’s freedom, his counsel had argued that the eighth
section of the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820 prohibited slavery beyond the thirty
degrees thirty minutes line, and therefore Dred Scott was free by virtue of this Act. In
support, counsel cited Congress’ expressed authority under the Constitution to “dispose
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States.” Taney made two key distinctions; first he gave a long
historical treatise designed to give the clause proper context and meaning at the time in
which it was written. Second, and more importantly, Taney distinguished between the
property “belonging to the United States” and private property held by the individual.
Both rights needed to be guarded with equal care, and as such Congress could not
“infringe upon the rights of persons or the rights of property of the citizen.” These were
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, particularly the Fifth Amendment, which
held that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. This protection trumped the authority of Congress to regulate property belonging to
it (the territories). As a result, the eighth section of the Missouri Compromise Act of
1820 was void, for “an Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States or
his liberty or property merely because he came himself or brought his property into a
particular territory of the U.S. and who had committed no offence against it could hardly
be dignified as due process of law.”13
The Scotts then were not free because of that provision, and further, the crux of
the Missouri Compromise was invalid prima facie, for it automatically deprived citizens
of their property simply upon geographical movement. The only remaining question to
consider was whether or not Dred Scott was free by virtue of his sojourn to Illinois, and
on this question Taney deferred in large part to the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, which ruled that he was in fact still property. At that point, the foregoing
portions of the opinion controlled, and Dred Scott was neither a citizen (the first
question), free (the second), and any federal legislation to the contrary of the first and

11 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 65-66
12 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 66
13 Hopkin, V.G. Dred Scott’s Case. P 70-71
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second points with regards to slaves as property was void via the Fifth Amendment (the
final point).
Almost immediately after Chief Justice Taney read his opinion from the bench, an
outpouring of sharp and biting criticism surrounded the justice. Accusations took on
three major forms, first that his judicial opinion was a reflection of his own views of
slavery rather than grounded in actual law, second that he had colluded with incoming
president Buchanan, and finally that his opinion was that of a Southerner who was part of
a conspiracy to expand slavery throughout the Union. The first point can nearly be
dismissed on its face; Taney’s written opinion, his deliberations, and his correspondence
indicate that his decision was grounded in a belief of the law. While many did and may
still disagree with the conclusions drawn from his particular analysis, there is little
evidence to suggest that Taney disregarded legal precedent in favor of his own personal
opinion. Belief in such a notion would render a long historical account of constitutional
provisions, a reflection on the origins of the legitimacy of slavery and a general refraining
from active politicking from the bench wholly unnecessary, yet Taney performed all
three throughout the case.14
The second point was far more serious and was articulated in a much more
effective manner than the first. William Seward, a Senator from New York, immediately
criticized the decision, being among the first, and certainly among the most vociferous to
proclaim it to be obiter dicta and thus non-binding. But Taney had already addressed
these objections, and thus the thrust of the attack came against his character. Seward first
offered a scathing attack on President Buchanan, and then alleged that upon his election
the Supreme Court and Taney approached him personally and made him aware of the
case. Furthermore, he alleged that the Court was prepared to simply dismiss the case for
want of jurisdiction (a conclusion that could have been reached after a finding that Dred
Scott was not a citizen) but instead Taney desired to offer a plum to the new president,
and therefore seized the opportunity to declare the Missouri compromise
unconstitutional, solidify the principle of slaves as property, and as such force slavery
throughout the United States “paramount to any popular sovereignty [(a reference to the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, which was also Constitutionally suspect after the decision)] within
the territories, and even to the authority of Congress itself.” In so doing, the Court
forfeited its dignity, unto which it had always held.15
The most powerful evidence against such claims of collusion came from letters of
correspondence between two other justices, S. Nelson and J.A. Campbell, who heard the
case, and Samuel Tyler, co-author of Taney’s Memoirs. In each letter, the accusations
are deemed “calumnious and spiteful,” and a review of both the case and the actions of
the Chief Justice were included. In both letters, Taney is seen neither communicating
with Buchanan concerning the case, nor preparing any opinion or deliberation with
anyone other than his fellow justices.16
Evidence of actual collusion is lacking not only because of the letters to the
contrary, but also because of the lack o f evidence of outside thought during Taney’s
deliberations with his fellow justices. Taney very well may have communicated with
14 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LL.D. P 373
15 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. Memoir O f Roger Brooke Tanev. LI..D. P 376
16 Taney, Roger B; Samuel Tyler. “Various Correspondence.” Memoir O f Roger Brooke Taney. LL.D. Pd
384
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President Buchanan, and may have even allowed him to see an advance copy of the
opinion, but the heart of Seward’s claim is that there was a form of corrupt bargaining
between Taney and Buchanan, and no such direct evidence is in support of it. More than
likely, Seward was dissatisfied with the outcome to the point where he would place
Taney in the center of what he and many other Northerner’s believed to be a Southern
conspiracy against the anti-slavery movement.
Thus the third point of criticism’s veracity (that of Taney being a part of that
conspiracy by virtue of being a Southerner in support of the institution) is the most
difficult to determine. Almost immediately, he was absolved from this charge by
newspapers, with the Cincinnati Enquirer condemning the attacks against him saying
“Mr. Taney personally is opposed to slavery in principle and practice. The position he
took was the result of a mistaken sense of duty and not of any partiality for slavery.”
Historians throughout history have furthered this view by arguing that Taney favored
gradual emancipation, that slavery was against his conscience and that in truth he was an
abolitionist at heart.17
Yet these sentiments, while endearing to the Chief Justice, in fact deny his record
prior to the case. As discussed beforehand, he favored allowing the states themselves to
choose their own courses of actions on numerous questions of economic and social
liberty. This would go starkly against the abolitionist stance that slavery should be
abolished by edict of the federal government. Even his written opinions, especially Prigg
and Groves, reflected a very strong sentiment in favor of slavery and in the preservation
of the institution. To deny that Taney was in fact a Southern gentleman is to deny the
reality of who sat at the head of the Court. Up until just before the Dred Scott decision,
Taney had become vehement and even partisan in his defense of slavery, but always
within the bounds of the law afforded to him.18
Thus it is not a contradiction to say that Taney personally favored slavery but did
not substitute his own passionate belief for it in place of the law. Rather, Taney believed
that the law did in fact support his beliefs, and a critical analysis of the standing law and
precedent of the time would tend to indicate that the notion of abolition in the Untied
States was the radical option at the time, whereas the status quo was a maintenance of
slavery as determined by the will of the individual states, the same state authority that
Taney supported, especially when juxtaposed to Marshall. Thus the opinion written by
Taney was founded upon tested legal grounds that went against the growing grain of the
North, and ultimately would be meted out on the fields of battle.
As to the question of whether or not Taney’s opinion served as the principal
catalyst for the Civil War, a reasoned analysis would reveal that it certainly participated
in the process, but was not in and of itself overtly responsible. The decision itself was
both highly formal and emotional in its delivery, and certainly contributed to growing
sectional animosity. Yet other important events would occur post-Dred Scott, including
the raid on Harper’s Ferry and the publishing of Uncle Tom's Cabin, which was without a
doubt read by many more citizens than Taney’s opinion was. In the end, the relationship

17 Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics. P 560
Quoted from subsection marked with *
18 Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics. P 560
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between Roger Taney’s Dred Scott opinion and the start of the civil war is contributory,
but not necessarily causal.19
Thus despite claims to the contrary, a careful analysis of Roger Taney reveals a
Southern man, believing in slavery, but believing above all in the rule of law. Taney
believed that the Constitution as written, combined with the history, precedent, and status
quo of the nation, supported the institution of slavery. Thus in Dred Scott’s case it was a
simple logical progression that led to the decision. Slaves were property. Dred Scott,
being a slave, was property. Also as a condition of slavery, he was not a citizen, and
therefore could not sue. Further, property could not be denied without due process of
law, something geographical movement did not raze, and finally, attempts at federal
legislation in contradiction of these points were to be held void. Roger Taney’s Opinion
of the Court was thus a product of reasoned jurisprudence; open to disagreement, but not
to be reduced to mere personal preference of the author.

19 Fehrenbacher, Don E. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics. P 562
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